February  2006  Market  Clearing  in  the  Energy  Industry  55  ©  Copyright  2005,  CCRO.  All  rights  reserved.  11.  APPENDIX  D:  BANKRUPTCY  CONSIDERATION44  DETAILS  An  important  component  to  the  legal  framework  for  any  clearing  solution  is  whether  the  netting  or  setoff  provided  by  the  solution  will  be  available  to  the  participants  and  enforceable  in  the  event  a  participant’s  counterparty  is  subject  to  bankruptcy  proceedings.  In  particular,  the  automatic  stay  in  bankruptcy,  which  suspends  a  creditor’s  right  to  exercise  remedies,  may  impair  the  financial  and  risk  mitigation  benefits  of  clearing.  The  U.S.  Bankruptcy  Code  contains  safe  harbors  specifically  applicable  to  the  set-offs  involved  in  clearing.  The  safe  harbors  enable  a  company  to  close  out  and  setoff  payments  owed  under  certain  contracts  that  may  be  in  effect,  regardless  of  the  automatic  stay  that  would  otherwise  be  applicable  in  bankruptcy.  Without  such  safe  harbors,  a  company  could  not  close  out  its  contracts  with  a  bankrupt  counterparty.  The  Bankruptcy  Code’s  treatment  of  setoffs  and  netting  applies  differently  to  different  types  of  entities.  For  example,  the  standard  provisions  of  the  Bankruptcy  Code  do  not  apply,  or  apply  with  significant  differences,  to  banks  and  thrifts,  credit  unions,  pension  plans,  and  a  range  of  municipalities  and  municipal  entities.  Other  differences  exist  under  the  Code  for  financial  intermediaries  such  as  brokers,  stockbrokers,  mutual  funds,  and  business  trusts.  Lastly,  the  U.S.  assets  of  a  foreign  entity  subject  to  a  foreign  bankruptcy  proceeding  also  receive  specialized  treatment  under  the  Code.  The  recent  changes  to  the  U.S.  Bankruptcy  Code  enacted  by  the  Bankruptcy  Abuse  Prevention  and  Consumer  Protection  Act  of  2005  resolves  the  previous  lack  of  any  specific  statutory  authority  to  net  between  securities  contracts,  commodities  contracts,  and  forward  contracts  and  thereby  avoid  an  automatic  stay  with  a  counterparty  subject  to  a  bankruptcy  proceeding.  The  concern  arose  when  a  party  conducted  its  securities,  commodities,  and  forward  contracts  transactions  through  a  single  entity,  for  example,  using  a  clearinghouse  solution,  and  therefore  attempted  to  net  the  exposures  under  all  three  types  of  products.  However,  under  prior  law,  the  party  might  have  then  found  that  it  was  unable  to  meet  the  requirements  imposed  by  the  safe  harbors  in  the  Bankruptcy  Code,  for  example,  that  the  obligations  to  be  setoff  be  between  the  same  parties,  who  are  standing  in  the  same  right  and  in  the  same  capacity.  Therefore,  under  previous  law,  it  was  not  settled  as  to  whether  offsetting  energy  contracts  would  be  fully  recognized  in  a  bankruptcy  proceeding.  The  recently  enacted  amendments  to  the  Bankruptcy  Code  enhance  the  netting  of  exposures  permitted  under  the  Code.  The  amendments  eliminate  ambiguities  as  to  the  enforceability  of  master  netting  agreements  and  to  expand  the  applicable  safe  harbors  from  the  automatic  stay  in  bankruptcy  for  netting.  In  practice,  the  amendments  should  permit  the  prompt  close  out  of  positions  and/or  transfer  of  positions  and  property  from  counterparty  in  default  to  another  
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